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Questions of how we know our own and other minds, and whether metacognition and mindreading rely
on the same processes, are longstanding in psychology and philosophy. In Experiment 1, children/
adolescents with autism (who tend to show attenuated mindreading) showed significantly lower accuracy
on an explicit metacognition task than neurotypical children/adolescents, but not on an allegedly
metacognitive implicit one. In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed these tasks in a single-task
condition or a dual-task condition that required concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped
mindreading. Metacognitive accuracy was significantly diminished by the dual-mindreading-task on the
explicit task but not the implicit task. In Experiment 3, we included additional dual-tasks to rule out the
possibility that any secondary task (regardless of whether it required mindreading) would diminish
metacognitive accuracy. Finally, in both Experiments 1 and 2, metacognitive accuracy on the explicit
task, but not the implicit task, was associated significantly with performance on a measure of mindread-
ing ability. These results suggest that explicit metacognitive tasks (used frequently to measure metacog-
nition in humans) share metarepresentational processing resources with mindreading, whereas implicit
tasks (which are claimed by some comparative psychologists to measure metacognition in nonhuman
animals) do not.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder, metacognition, mindreading, dual-task, theory of mind
Questions of how we know our own minds, how we know other
minds, and whether nonhuman animals are capable of such self- or
other-awareness, have proven to be some of the most enduring and
important in the history of psychology and philosophy. The ex-
periments described here were designed to throw light on both sets
of questions at once. We begin by discussing the relationship
between self-knowledge and other-knowledge in humans.
Metacognition (metarepresentation of one’s own mental states)
is considered essential for day-to-day behavioral functioning be-
cause it is this monitoring of one’s internal states that allows one
to regulate those states (Nelson & Leonesio, 1988). Mindreading
(metarepresentation of others’ mental states; sometimes referred to
as “theory of mind”) is likewise important for almost all domains
of human social life, and when it is diminished most aspects of
social life suffer. For example, autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is
a developmental disorder diagnosed on the basis of significant
impairments in social-communication and behavioral flexibility
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and is characterized
unambiguously by diminished mindreading ability (e.g., Happé,
1995). Thus, the clinical significance of understanding the rela-
tionship between mindreading and metacognition is high.
A number of opposing theories have been proposed, offering
differing accounts of the relation between these two important
abilities. For example, some have thought that mindreading devel-
ops ontogenetically and phylogenetically from an existing meta-
cognitive system along with additional imagination/mental simu-
lation abilities (metacognition-is-prior theory; e.g., Goldman,
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2006). Others have claimed that metacognition and mindreading
rely on entirely distinct systems (two-systems theory; e.g., Nichols
& Stich, 2003). And yet others have argued that both involve a
single metarepresentational system that processes both the mental
states of self and of others (one-system theory; e.g., Carruthers,
2009, 2011). Crucially each of these theoretical accounts provides
differing predictions for how these abilities might relate to each
other experimentally. In the current investigation, we tackled these
issues using complementary approaches in three experiments.
Before getting to the experiments, however, something further
should be said about what the talk of “systems” here amounts to.
Consider the one-system view first. This holds that there is a single
core competence—involving a common set of conceptual re-
sources and implicating the same mindreading network in the
brain—underlying both our attributions of mental states to other
people and to ourselves. While many of the inputs to the system
may differ across the two cases (e.g., including one’s own inner
speech, bodily feelings, and visual imagery in the first-person case
only), essentially the same cognitive and inferential resources are
involved in processing those inputs. In the version proposed and
defended by Carruthers (2011), moreover, the system evolved in
the first instance for third-person social purposes. Self-awareness
results from turning that third-person system on the self.
In contrast, the two-systems view maintains that there are dis-
tinct and dissociable networks in the brain responsible for attrib-
uting mental states to other people and to oneself, though it can be
left open whether or not the two systems draw upon the same set
of conceptual resources (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Hence one’s
capacities to draw inferences about the mental states of others can
be damaged or interfered with without damaging or interfering
with one’s ability to attribute mental states to oneself, and vice
versa. This view can remain neutral on the question of the evolu-
tionary emergence of the two capacities.
Finally, the metacognition-is-prior account maintains that attrib-
uting mental states to other people implicates a prior ability to
attribute those states to oneself. It is by first being aware of one’s
own mental states, and then projecting such states to other people
using one’s imaginative or simulative abilities, that one comes to
understand the minds of others. On this view, there will be a
common set of conceptual abilities involved in both self-
attribution and other attribution, but the cognitive and inferential
resources required for the latter will go well beyond what are
needed for self-awareness (Goldman, 2006). A prediction of the
view, then, is that mindreading abilities can be lost or interfered
with without losing or interfering with metacognitive ones, but any
task that interferes with the metacognitive component of mind-
reading will thereby interfere with the latter also. This view is
often understood to go along with the claim that metacognitive
abilities emerged in phylogeny prior to mindreading ones.
Turning now to our experiments, in Experiment 1 (case-control
experiment), we tested metacognition (using a classic “judgement
of confidence” paradigm) and mindreading in children and ado-
lescents with ASD, as well as in age- and IQ-matched neurotypical
(NT) comparison participants. We know that ASD tends to involve
a mindreading impairment, so if the one-system theory is correct,
then participants with ASD should also manifest difficulties with
metacognition. In contrast, both metacognition-is-prior and two-
systems theorists have predicted explicitly that metacognition will
be unimpaired in ASD, claiming that autism will reveal a crucial
dissociation between metacognition and mindreading that would
support their theories (Goldman, 2006; Nichols & Stich, 2003;
Raffman, 1999; Wojcik, Waterman, Lestié, Moulin, & Souchay,
2014).
As we have just noted, actual proponents of the metacognition-
is-prior view have predicted that metacognition will be unimpaired
in ASD. This is because they have thought that the impairment in
mindreading in ASD is likely to result from the known difficulties
such people have with imagining and pretending and because they
think that mindreading results from a combination of metacogni-
tion with imagination or simulation (Goldman, 2006). But such a
position isn’t mandatory for a metacognition-is-prior theorist. It
could be maintained instead that the difficulties with mindreading
in ASD result from an underlying metacognitive deficit. In that
case, this view, too, would predict that metacognitive abilities will
be impaired in autism. This form of metacognition-is-prior view is
not directly tested in the experiments that follow. But notice that if
we succeed in showing (both here and in Nicholson, Williams,
Grainger, Lind, & Carruthers, 2019) that the tests of metacognition
employed with monkeys are not genuinely metacognitive in na-
ture, then one significant strand of support (as detailed below) for
all metacognition-is-prior views will have been undermined. In
what follows, when we refer to the metacognition-is-prior theory
we intend just the version defended by Goldman (2006), which
predicts intact metacognition in ASD.
In Experiment 2 (dual-task experiment), instead of studying
metacognition in a population with existing mindreading difficul-
ties we tried to, in a sense, induce mindreading difficulties in
neurotypical people by using a dual-task paradigm. In a dual-task
paradigm, participants complete a primary task either alone
(single-task condition) or concurrently with a secondary task
(dual-task condition). If the primary and secondary tasks share
processing resources, then primary task performance will be sig-
nificantly poorer in the dual-task condition than in the single-task
condition, because both tasks are competing for a limited resource.
In Experiment 2, neurotypical adults completed metacognition
tasks either alone or alongside a secondary task that tapped min-
dreading. If metacognition depends on the same metarepresenta-
tional resources as mindreading, then metacognition should be
significantly poorer in the dual-task condition. The two-systems
view, at any rate, makes no such prediction.
We turn now to the question of whether nonhuman animals are
aware of their own and other minds. It turns out that this is directly
related to the question of whether metacognition depends on the
same metarepresentational resources as mindreading. Some theo-
rists have suggested that some species of nonhuman primates
(macaques, in particular) are capable of metarepresenting their
own epistemic mental states, despite apparently lacking the equiv-
alent ability to metarepresent the epistemic mental states of con-
specifics (Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 2009;
Martin & Santos, 2014; Smith, Beran, Couchman, & Coutinho,
2008; Smith, Couchman, & Beran, 2014; Son & Kornell, 2005). If
this interpretation of the data is correct, then these findings chal-
lenge the one-system view but are in keeping with both other
views.
However, some have argued that the tasks used to assess meta-
cognition in nonhuman primates are not truly metacognitive (do
not require metarepresentation of self), claiming that they can be
successfully completed using first-order, nonmetacognitive pro-
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cesses rather than second-order, genuinely metacognitive pro-
cesses (Carruthers, 2011). That is, it has been said that instead of
monitoring their own states of certainty or uncertainty, as most
comparative psychologists assume (a second-order, metacognitive,
process), the animals can succeed in these tasks through first-order
(cognitive rather than metacognitive) kinds of risk-evaluation
(Carruthers & Ritchie, 2012).
In the current study, we set out to test these competing inter-
pretations of the animal data, too. We were able to do so because
if humans solve the sorts of task conducted with monkeys without
employing metacognition, then this provides at least a “proof of
concept” that the monkeys are doing so too. We therefore em-
ployed a version of the “gambling task” introduced by Son and
Kornell (2005), which has been used to assess metacognition in
nonhuman primates (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007). This task is
in many respects structurally equivalent to the classic judgment-
of-confidence task used to measure metacognition in humans (and
which we also use in the current study). Strictly speaking, how-
ever, the gambling task measures the degree to which strategic
behavioral responses are accurate (rather than the extent to which
verbal metacognitive judgments are accurate, as in the explicit
judgment-of-confidence task). In what follows, we refer to the
gambling task as “the implicit task” (because it is, putatively, implic-
itly metacognitive in nature) and the judgment-of-confidence task as
“the explicit task” (because it requires participants to reflect explicitly
on their own internal states and provide a verbal response).
In the task employed with monkeys by Kornell et al. (2007), the
animals were first required to make a primary discrimination of
some sort (e.g., judging the longest of a set of lines) before being
asked to place a “bet” on the correctness of that choice. Having
made their initial discrimination, they could either select a “high
risk” symbol that would issue in a large reward if they had made
the correct choice and a large loss if they had got it wrong, or they
could select a “low risk” symbol that gave small payoffs or
penalties. According to the authors, the monkeys solve this task by
monitoring their uncertainty about the correctness of their initial
choice, gambling or declining to gamble accordingly. The task is
thus thought to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive pro-
cesses in these animals.
An alternative, nonmetacognitive interpretation of the data is
also possible, however. For we know that easy tasks are ones that
are performed fluently, and fluency is known to give rise to
positive valence, whereas disfluent tasks cause negative valence
(Casasanto & Chrysikou, 2011; Carr, Rotteveel, & Winkielman,
2016). So a primary discrimination task that is executed fluently
will result in a state of positive affect, which is known in humans
to increase risk-taking (Gasper & Clore, 2000). Hence the high-
risk option will seem good to participants following fluent perfor-
mance. In contrast, disfluent execution will produce negative af-
fect, making the high-risk option seem bad. Metarepresentation of
self is thus unnecessary to produce accurate performance on the
gambling task.
It is worth noticing that processing fluency is among the cues
that humans frequently use when making explicit metacognitive
judgments (Dunlosky & Metcalfe, 2009; Hertzog, Dunlosky, Rob-
inson, & Kidder, 2003). But, of course, the fact that processing
fluency can provide a cue for a metacognitive judgment doesn’t
mean that processing fluency is itself metacognitive. Ease of
processing is one thing; awareness that processing is easy is
another. Only the latter is metacognitive in nature.
One of our goals was to discriminate between the two compet-
ing explanations of the cognitive resources employed in the im-
plicit task (metacognitive or nonmetacognitive). If the implicit
gambling tasks that have been used with monkeys really do require
metarepresentation of self, then gambling accuracy should be
diminished to the same extent as judgment-of-confidence accuracy
in (a) participants with ASD relative to comparison participants in
Experiment 1 and (b) the dual-task condition relative to the single-
task condition in Experiment 2—provided, that is, that metacog-
nition and mindreading share resources, as postulated by one-
system views and metacognition-is-prior theories.
A complete set of predictions for both experiments is shown in
Table 1 (our own predictions are listed in the bottom row). Note
that our task design enabled us simultaneously to pit the one-
system account of the relation between mindreading and metacog-
nition against its opponents, as well as pitting first-order against
metacognitive interpretations of the implicit gambling tasks that
have been used with monkeys.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Twenty-five children/adolescents with ASD
and 25 neurotypical (NT) comparison children/adolescents took
part in the study. All participants completed the Wechsler
Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II (Wechsler, 1999), which
provides verbal, performance, and full-scale IQ scores, as well
as two widely used measures of mindreading (see details be-
low). Mindreading tasks were included to ensure the ASD
group was representative of the population in showing a min-
dreading impairment (otherwise the predictions of one-system
theory could not be tested in this experiment).
Participants in the ASD group had received verified diagno-
ses, according to conventional criteria (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000; WHO, 1992). The parents of all participants
completed the Social Responsiveness Scale-II (Constantino &
Gruber, 2012) to provide an index of number of ASD features/
traits manifested in participants (T scores of 50 represent the
population average; T scores 59 indicate clinically significant
levels of ASD traits/features). Participant characteristics and
group matching statistics are presented in Table 2. All partici-
pants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none of
them was color blind. Ethical approval for Experiments 1 and 2
was given by the School of Psychology, University of Kent
Research Ethics Committee (Ref: 201815281154425026), and
informed consent was obtained from the parents of all partici-
pants and the participants themselves.
Materials and methods.
Mindreading task 1. The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task
(RMIE; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001)
is a widely used measure of mindreading in clinical and nonclini-
cal populations. Participants completed a child version of the
RMIE task (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Spong, Scahill, & Law-
son, 2001). The child version includes 28 photographs of the
eye-region of the face taken from the adult version of the task. On
each trial, participants were asked to pick one word from a selec-
3LINKING METACOGNITION AND MINDREADING
tion of four to indicate what the person in the picture was thinking
or feeling. If participants felt more than one of the words was
applicable, they were instructed to select the word they thought
was most suitable. Stimuli were presented on screen to participants
in a random order, and no time limit was imposed. Scores on the
RMIE task range from zero to 28, with higher scores indicating
better performance on the task. The proportion of items cor-
rectly identified by ASD and comparison participants is shown
in Table 2.
It should be noted that although the RMIE can be characterized
as a kind of empathy task, it is also undoubtedly a task that requires
mindreading of the mental states of the target agents. For in each
case what has to be selected is the most appropriate mental-state
descriptor. The task has been employed in over 250 studies, shows
good test–retest reliability (e.g., Fernández-Abascal, Cabello,
Fernández-Berrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2013), clearly distinguishes
groups of participants with and without ASD (e.g., Wilson et al.,
2014), is associated with the number of ASD traits shown by
individuals in large population studies (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001), and is correlated with other measures of mindreading even
after the influence of IQ is statistically controlled (e.g., Jones et al.,
2018).
Mindreading task 2. We employed a version of the Animations
Task (Abell, Happé, & Frith, 2000) as a second measure of mind-
Table 1
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Yes: because only the
explicit task involves
the mindreading
system, so only the
explicit task is
affected
No: because only the
explicit task involves
the mindreading
system, so only the
explicit task is
affected
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder.
a The metacognition-is-prior view represented here is the version actually defended by theorists in the literature, according to which metacognition should
not be damaged in ASD. Another possible version of metacognition-is-prior view, according to which metacognitive deficits lie at the base of the
well-known mindreading difficulties in ASD, is not addressed in these experiments or in our discussion (except in passing).
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reading. The task, which is based on Heider and Simmel (1944),
required participants to describe interactions between a large red
triangle and a small blue triangle, as portrayed in a series of silent
video clips. Four such clips are apt to invoke an explanation of the
triangles’ behavior in terms of epistemic mental states, such as belief,
intention, and deception. These clips comprise the “mentalizing”
condition of the task and were employed in this study.
Each clip was presented to participants on a computer screen.
After the clip was finished, participants described what had hap-
pened in the clip. An audio recording of participants’ responses
was made for later transcription. Each transcript was scored on a
scale of zero to two for accuracy (including reference to specific
mental states), based on the criteria outlined in Abell et al. (2000).
Eighty percent of transcripts were also scored by two independent
raters, each of whom was blind to the diagnostic group of the
participant and any other results from the study. Interrater reliabil-
ity was excellent according to Cicchetti’s (1994) criteria (intraclass
correlations .84). Accuracy (proportion) among ASD and com-
parison participants is shown in Table 2. Note that the Animations
Task is a measure of spontaneous mental-state attribution. Those
who score highly on this measure are spontaneously interpreting
the movements of the geometric figures in the videos in mental-
state terms. Those who score low on this measure, in contrast, will
tend to provide literal (nonmentalistic) descriptions of the move-
ments they have observed.
Experimental gambling and judgment-of-confidence tasks.
There were two experimental tasks (implicit gambling and explicit
judgment-of-confidence), both of which involved an object-level
component that required participants to make perceptual discrim-
ination judgments and a (supposed) metalevel component that
required them to make a judgment or decision about the accuracy
of their perceptual discrimination judgment. It is important to note
that participants always completed the implicit task before the
explicit task to avoid transfer of explicit metacognitive strategies
from the latter to the former. The structure of the object-level
component was identical in each task, but the metalevel compo-
nent differed in each. Below, we describe first the object-level
component that was common to both tasks and then the specific
procedures of each task individually.
Object-level perceptual discrimination component. Two ver-
sions of the object-level component were created and participants
completed one version in the gambling task and the other version
in the judgment-of-confidence task. In one version (color stimuli
version), stimuli comprised pairs of arrays that varied in shade of
blue (from very dark to very light blue). On each trial, participants
were presented with two arrays, and their task was to select (via
mouse click) the array displaying the lightest shade of blue. In the
other version (pixel stimuli version), stimuli comprised pairs of
arrays that varied in pixel density (from very densely to very
sparsely pixelated). On each trial, participants were presented with
two arrays, and their task was to select (via mouse click) the array
that was most densely pixelated. In each version (color/pixel), each
pair varied in terms of how perceptually similar its members were.
The more similar the arrays in each pair were, the more difficult it
was to discriminate between them. In each version, there was a
range of trial difficulty with some trials involving highly similar
pairs of arrays and other trials involving highly dissimilar pairs of
arrays, along with a wide range in between. Similarity between
arrays across trials was determined using a random number gen-
erator. For pixel trials, the difference in pixel numbers between the
two arrays was generated using a random number generator with
requested outputs of 10–80, based on pilot testing to determine
average discrimination sensitivity. For color trials, variation in
blue color between arrays was determined by varying the lumi-
nance of each array, in python RGB color space, and was again
generated by a random number generator with requested outputs of
0.001 to 0.5 (again based on pilot testing to determine average
discrimination sensitivity). All participants received the same stim-
uli sets. Task scripts and stimuli parameters are published in an
open access GitHub repository (https://github.com/cathgrainger/
Explicit-Implicit-JOC-tasks). Importantly, pilot testing was con-
ducted to ensure that the two versions (color/pixel) were of equiv-
alent difficulty and that object-level perceptual discrimination
performance was well above chance but well below ceiling on
both. Half of the participants in each group were assigned the color
stimuli version for the implicit (gambling) task and the pixel
stimuli version for the explicit (judgment-of-confidence) task, and
half were assigned the pixel stimuli version for the implicit task
and the color stimuli version for the explicit task. All stimuli were
presented on a 22-in computer screen. We now describe the
specific procedure involved in each task.
Implicit (gambling) task. The main procedure for the implicit
task (object- and “meta” components) is illustrated in Figure 1a
(note that “meta-” is written in inverted commas here to highlight
the fact that, while this phase of the task is assumed by some
researchers to require metacognitive monitoring, we did not be-
lieve that it necessarily did). This task was modeled closely on
methods that have been employed with nonhuman animals in
previous research. It was explained to participants that they would
be shown a series of pairs of patches (arrays) on a computer screen
Table 2
Experiment 1 Participant Characteristics and Group Matching Statistics
Variable ASD (n  25) NT (n  25) t p d
Age 12.71 (1.52) 13.17 (1.54) 1.07 .29 0.30
VIQ 105.92 (9.90) 109.20 (10.82) 1.12 .27 0.32
PIQ 109.36 (13.04) 113.56 (13.91) 1.10 .28 0.31
SRS T-score 84.75 (9.45) 45.88 (10.47) 13.62 .001 3.90
RMIE proportion correcta .69 (.08) .73 (10) 1.42 .08 0.41
Animations proportion correct .46 (.24) .70 (.18) 4.01 .001 1.14
Note. VIQ  verbal IQ; PIQ  performance IQ; SRS  Social Responsiveness Scale; RMIE  Reading the Mind in the Eyes; ASD  autism spectrum
disorder; NT  neurotypical.
a One participant with ASD became distressed when completing this task, so data was collected from only 24 participants.
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that either differed in the number of pixels contained in each
member of the pair (if they had been assigned to the pixel stimuli
version), or in the shade of blue (if they had been assigned to the
color stimuli version). Accordingly, they were instructed to select
the patch with the greatest number of pixels or the patch with the
lightest blue using the computer mouse and were told that they
would have 3 s to make each selection. This was the object-level
component, described in the preceding section.
The “meta-” level component was subsequently introduced to
participants (without using any metacognitive language) in the fol-
lowing way. The experimenter explained that, after each of these
perceptual discrimination judgments had been made, a new screen
would appear that displayed a square and a triangle and that the
participant must select one of these shapes via mouse click. Partici-
pants were told that they would start with a balance of 50 points and
would win or lose points depending on their responses. They were
informed that at the end of the task, they had the chance to win a prize
depending on how many points they gained on the task (in fact, at the
end of the experiment, all participants received a prize). They were
given written and verbal instructions as follows:
a) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue
patch, if completing the color version) and choose the trian-
gle, you will win 30 points;
Figure 1. a. Details of the procedure for the implicit (gambling) task. Schematic representation of one trial of
the implicit gambling task (pixel version) from Experiment 1. For the object-level component of each trial,
participants either completed the color or pixel version. In the pixel version, participants had to click on the patch
which had the greatest number of pixels (here the correct answer is the right patch). For the “meta”-level
component, participants were presented with a triangle and a circle and asked to click on one of these. After
selecting a shape, participants received feedback based on the accuracy (object-level) and which shape they
chose (metalevel), as displayed on the far right of the image (in this example, the participant has lost 10 points
because they selected the circle [low risk option] having made an incorrect object-level perceptual judgment).
Participants had 3 s to make each of their selections, and if the failed to do so for either the object or “meta”
level, they received miss feedback. Participants began with 50 points, which was displayed on the bottom right
of the screen, and this value updated on each trial based on their feedback, giving participants on ongoing
awareness of their score. b. Details of the procedure for the explicit (judgment of confidence) task. Schematic
representation of one trial of the explicit judgment of confidence task (color version). For the object-level
component, if participants had completed the pixel version of the implicit task, they would complete the color
version for the explicit task and vice versa. This time after making their object-level selection, they were asked
“Are you confident?” and could select “Yes” or “No.” Participants then received feedback based on their
selections at the end of each trial. Participants had 3 s to make each of their selections and if the failed to respond
to either the object or meta level decision within this time they received miss feedback. Once again in both tasks,
participants began with 50 points, which was displayed on the bottom right of the screen, and this value updated
on each trial based on their feedback, giving participants on ongoing awareness of their score. See the online
article for the color version of this figure.
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b) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue
patch) and choose the circle, you will win 10 points;
c) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue
patch) and choose the triangle, you will lose 30 points;
d) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue
patch) and choose the circle, you will lose 10 points.
As such, the triangle represented the “high risk” symbol (large
reward if the perceptual discrimination was correct but large loss
if the perceptual discrimination was incorrect), and the circle
represented the “low risk” symbol (small reward if the perceptual
discrimination was correct, but small loss if the perceptual dis-
crimination was incorrect). It is important to stress, however, that
participants never had the rules described to them in these terms,
and great care was taken not to use metacognitive language when
instructing them.
After the task had been explained and any requests for clarifi-
cation had been addressed, participants completed 10 practice
trials on which their responses did not count toward their final
points total. They were asked whether they understood the rules
and given a final chance to ask for clarification before beginning
the actual task, but no further information about the nature of the
task or the study aims was offered. At this point they were asked
to complete the 60 experimental trials. The participant’s running
total of points was displayed on the bottom left of the computer
screen throughout the experiment and updated automatically trial
by trial.
At the end of the implicit task, participants’ memory for the
response rules was tested by presenting each rule (shown in
bullet points a to d above) and asked them to complete the
points value for each response type. The difference in the
proportion recalled correctly by participants with ASD (M 
.88, SD  .22) and comparison participants (M  .95, SD 
.13) was statistically small and nonsignificant, t  1.39, p 
.17, d  0.39, BF10  0.62 (see the section “statistical analysis”
for explanations of the statistical tests used).
Dependent variables for the implicit task were calculated using
“Type I” and “Type II” signal detection theory. Type I/Object-
level sensitivity was calculated as d= (i.e. participant ability to
discriminate between the two perceptual arrays) and reported in
RMS (root mean square) units. Object-level response bias (c) was
also calculated in RMS units. “Type II” signal detection theory
was used to characterize the metacognitive sensitivity of partici-
pants’ confidence reports to their correct or incorrect judgments
using the meta-d= statistic (see Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco
& Lau, 2012). Meta-d= was fit to confidence rating data using a
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) model, implemented
in open access Python code (please see; http://www.columbia
.edu/~bsm2105/type2sdt/). Employing a Meta-d= approach al-
lowed for metacognitive sensitivity to be compared with object-
level decision accuracy (“Type I” signal detection theory; d=) to
provide a relative measure of metacognitive efficiency (meta-d=/
d=), controlling for object-level task performance. Metacognitive
efficiency is the key variable of interest in the current study
because it provides a measure of metacognitive monitoring accu-
racy that is unbiased by cognitive-/object-level performance. In
order to avoid cell counts of 0 interfering with meta-d= model
fitting, a correction of 0.25 was added to each stimuli response
count, using the correction formula 1/(2numRatings), as recom-
mended by Maniscalco and Lau (http://www.columbia.edu/~bsm
2105/type2sdt/). Finally, the degree of participants’ “risk taking”
was calculated as the proportion of times the high-risk triangle
symbol was selected (this can also be thought of as type-2 response
bias).
Explicit (judgment of confidence) task. The main procedure
for the explicit condition is illustrated in Figure 1b. The general
procedure and points structure were identical to the implicit task.
The key difference was that on each trial of the explicit task, after
each perceptual discrimination judgment, a new screen appeared
containing the question, “Are you confident?” and the words “yes”
or “no”, rather than a square and a triangle. Participants were told
that, on each trial, if they felt confident they had chosen the most
densely pixelated patch (or lightest blue patch, if completing the
color stimuli version), they should select the “yes” option via
mouse click. In contrast, if they did not feel confident they had
chosen the most densely pixelated patch (or lightest blue patch, if
completing the color stimuli version), they should select the “no”
option via mouse click. Participants were given a set of instruc-
tions outlining the consequences of each choice and informed that,
at the end of the task, they had the chance to win a prize depending
on how many points they gained on the task (in fact, at the end of
the experiment, all participants received a prize). Just as for the
implicit gambling task, participants were told that they would start
with a balance of 50 points and would win or lose points depend-
ing on their responses. They were given written and verbal instruc-
tions as follows:
e) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue
patch, if completing the color stimuli version) and answer
“yes”, you will win 30 points;
f) If you click on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue
patch) and answer “no”, you will win 10 points;
g) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue
patch) and answer “yes”, you will lose 30 points;
h) If you click on the patch with fewest pixels (or deepest blue
patch) and answer “no”, you will lose 10 points.
Participants completed 10 practice trials and were then asked
whether they understood the rules and were given a final chance to
ask for clarification before beginning the experimental task, but no
further information about the nature of the task or the study aims
was offered. At this point they were asked to complete the main
experimental task, comprising 60 trials. The participant’s running
total of points was displayed on the bottom left of the computer
screen throughout the experiment and updated automatically trial
by trial.
At the end of the task, the participant’s memory for the response
rules was tested; the experimenter presented the participant with
each rule (shown in bullet points e to h above) and asked them to
complete the points value for each response type. The difference in
the proportion recalled correctly by participants with ASD (M 
.96, SD  .12) and comparison participants (M  .97, SD  .08)
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was statistically small and nonsignificant, t  0. 35, p  .73, d 
0.10, BF10  0.29.
Explicit task performance was calculated using the same mea-
sures as implicit task performance (see above) with four key
response measures: (a) object-level sensitivity, calculated as d=; (b)
object-level response bias, calculated as c; (c) metalevel bias,
calculated as the proportion of times the “yes” option was selected
when asked “Are you confident?”; and (d) metacognitive effi-
ciency, calculated as a meta d= to d= ratio. As with analysis of the
implicit gambling task data, metacognitive efficiency is the key
variable of interest in the current paper because it provides a
measure of metacognitive monitoring accuracy that is unbiased by
object-level performance.
Statistical power and analysis. An alpha level of .05 was
used to determine statistical significance. Where t tests were used,
we report Cohen’s d values as an index of effect size (0.20 
small effect, 0.50  moderate effect; 0.80  large effect;
Cohen, 1969). Where ANOVAs were used, we report partial eta
squared (p2) values as an index of effect size (.01  small
effect, .06  moderate effect, .14  large effect; Cohen,
1969). Where correlations are reported, we use Pearson’s r as an
index of effect size (.01  small effect r .30  moderate
effect, .50  large effect), but note that correlations were not a
key focus of the current investigation (see General Discussion).
To estimate the necessary sample size to detect the key results,
a power calculation was conducted using GPower3 (Faul, Erd-
felder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). The main aim of Experiment 1
was to establish whether judgment-of-confidence accuracy is sig-
nificantly diminished in ASD (which we predicted would be the
case) and/or whether gambling accuracy is significantly dimin-
ished in ASD (which we predicted would not be the case). How-
ever, considerations regarding sample size were not straightfor-
ward. First, estimating an effect size for group differences in key
dependent variables was a challenge. There is little previous re-
search on metacognitive monitoring in ASD and existing studies
have used a variety of tasks that are arguably not directly compa-
rable (e.g., Cooper, Plaisted-Grant, Baron-Cohen, & Simons,
2016; Grainger, Williams, & Lind, 2016a, 2016b; Nicholson et al.,
2019; Williams, Bergström, & Grainger, 2018; Williams & Happé,
2010; Williams & Happé, 2009; Wilkinson, Best, Minshew, &
Strauss, 2010; Wojcik, Allen, Brown, & Souchay, 2011; Wojcik et
al., 2014), so basing an effect size on the weighted effect size
across previous studies was inappropriate, in our view. Second, we
predicted a null effect for the between-groups difference in gam-
bling accuracy, which makes estimating “sufficient power” diffi-
cult. Therefore, we adopted two approaches.
First, based on theoretical principles, we estimated that the
magnitude of the between-groups difference in judgment-of-
confidence accuracy would be equivalent to the magnitude of the
between-groups difference in mindreading task performance (d 
0.88, according to Yirmiya, Erel, Shaked, & Solomonica-Levi’s
[1998] meta-analysis). Twenty-five participants per group pro-
vides power of .86, assuming an alpha level of .05 using two-tailed
tests (or .96 if using one-tailed tests), which meets Cohen’s (1992)
criteria for sufficient power.
Second, we calculated a Bayes factor (BF10) for each key
analysis. Bayesian analyses supplement null hypothesis signifi-
cance testing by providing an estimation of the relative strength of
a finding for the alternative hypothesis over the null, or vice versa.
This allows a more graded interpretation of the data than is
possible using p values or effect sizes alone (e.g., Dienes, 2014;
Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009) and is particu-
larly useful for interpreting null findings because it provides an
index of the extent to which data supports the null over the
alternative hypothesis (unlike a nonsignificant p value, which
indicates only that we should not be confident the alternative
hypothesis is supported). BF10 values can be considered to reflect
the probability that the alternative hypothesis is more likely to be
true than the null hypothesis. Hence, a BF10 of 3 suggests the
alternative hypothesis is three times more likely to be true than the
null hypothesis. According to Jeffreys’ (1961) criteria, Bayes
factors (BF10)  3 provide firm evidence for the alternative
hypothesis (with values 10, 30, and 100 providing strong,
very strong, and decisive evidence, respectively), and values under
1 provide evidence for the null (with values 0.33 providing firm
evidence). Bayesian analyses were conducted using JASP 0.8.1
(JASP team, 2016).
Results
Table 3 shows object level performance (sensitivity and bias), as
well as metalevel performance (M-ratio scores) among participants
from each diagnostic group (ASD/NT) on each of the tasks (im-
plicit/explicit) tasks. Meta d= was calculated separately for implicit
task performance in the ASD group (M  .91, SD  84), and NT
group (M  1.03, SD  .71), as well as for explicit task perfor-
mance in the ASD group (M  .88, SD  .74) and NT group (M 
1.36, SD  .82). These were then used to calculate metacognitive
efficiency as an m-ratio. M-Ratio scores (meta-d=/d=) were subject
to a group (ASD/TD)  task (Implicit/Explicit) mixed ANOVA
(see Table 1 for descriptive statistics), which yielded a nonsignif-
icant effect of task, F(1, 48)  0.20, p  .66, p2  .004, and a
nonsignificant effect of group, F(1, 48)  0.49, p  .49, p2  .01.
However, a significant Group  Task interaction was found, F(1,
48)  4.01, p  .05, p2  .08. Independent samples t tests
indicated that the M-ratio score was significantly diminished
among participants with ASD on the explicit task, but not the
implicit task.
Finally, judgment-of-confidence M-ratio score was nonsignifi-
cantly associated with implicit gambling M-ratio, r  .001, p 
.99, or with performance on the RMIE mindreading task, r  .06,
p  .67. However, judgment-of-confidence M-ratio was associated
significantly with performance on the Animations mindreading
task, when analyzed using one-tailed tests of significance, r  .24,
p  .05. In contrast, implicit gambling M-ratio was nonsignifi-
cantly associated with either RMIE or Animations mindreading
measures, rs .03, ps  .43.
Summary
In keeping with multiple previous findings, we found metacog-
nitive monitoring accuracy to be significantly diminished among
children/adolescents with ASD on an explicit judgment of confi-
dence task. In contrast, “meta-” level performance on an implicit
gambling measure was undiminished among participants with
ASD. These findings are in line with our predictions that individ-
uals with ASD should have metacognitive impairments and that
gambling tasks of the sort used among nonhuman primates do not
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necessarily measure metacognition, contrary to the claims of many
comparative psychologists. Indeed, metalevel performance on the
implicit task was not associated significantly with metalevel per-
formance on the explicit task, further suggesting that gambling
tasks of this kind do not necessarily measure metacognition. Fi-
nally, metalevel performance on the explicit task, but not the
implicit task, was associated significantly with mindreading ability
(performance on the Animations mindreading task, at least). We
will return to address these associations in the General Discussion.




Participants. 160 participants (25 male) with a mean age of
19.35 (SD  2.18) years were recruited from the University of
Kent in exchange for course credits as part of their degree. All
participants provided informed consent and reported no history of
ASD. The study was ethically approved by the University of Kent
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (Ref:
201715084953804613).
Materials and procedures. Each participant completed one of
the two tasks used in Experiment 1 (implicit gambling or explicit
judgment of confidence) under one of two conditions (single- or
dual-task). There were 40 participants in each condition. There were
no significant differences between conditions in terms of participant
age, F(1, 159)  1.15, p  .33, p2  .02, or gender, 
2  2.42, p 
.49, 	  .12. Participants who undertook the gambling or judgment-
of-confidence task under single task conditions also completed the
mindreading measures (RMIE & Animations) used in Experiment 1
(note that these mindreading measures were not employed among
participants who completed the dual-task conditions because the dual-
task conditions already taxed mindreading). One participant who
completed the explicit dual-task condition was excluded from the
results based on being a significant outlier, with an M-ratio score that
was more than 5.5 standard deviations from the mean. No other
participant scored 3SD different from the mean in any condition.
The gambling and judgment of confidence tasks were identical
to those used in Experiment 1, except participants in Experiment 2
received real financial incentives, rather that the points for prizes
that children/adolescents had won in Experiment 1. Each point in
Experiment 1 was equivalent to 1p (pence) in Experiment 2.
Hence, in the judgment-of-confidence task, for example, if the
participant clicked on the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue
patch) and they selected “yes”, they would win 30p (rather than the
30 points that children/adolescents won in Experiment 1). If they
chose the patch with most pixels (or lightest blue patch) and they
selected “no”, they would win 10p (rather than the 10 points that
children won in Experiment 1), and so forth. Participants began
with a balance of £2.00 and were told that they would win or lose
money based on their responses on each trial. The gambling and
judgment-of-confidence payment rules were the same regardless
of whether participants completed them under single or dual-task
conditions. Participants who completed one of the tasks under
dual-task conditions also completed an auditory mindreading task
concurrently and received financial incentives for that secondary
task also.
For the auditory mindreading task, participants heard via head-
phones a collection of auditory stimuli taken from the Cambridge
Mindreading Voice battery (Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Hill, 2006).
These are a series of 50 short phrases, spoken by professional
actors and ranging from 2–3 s in length, projecting different
emotional and mental states. At the start of a dual task trial, a
phrase was presented, followed by two mental state words, the
target mental state and a foil. Mental state words were presented in
sequence, the first 1 s after the end of the mental state phrase
(mental state option 1), and then the other 1 s later (mental state
option 2). The order in which targets and foils were presented was
counterbalanced across clips. For example, on one trial, partici-
pants heard the phrase “That’s not what I was told”, followed by
the words “Uneasy” (correct response) and “Provoked” (foil re-
sponse). In another trial, participants heard the phrase, “That is
horrible,” followed by the words “Disturbed” (foil response) and
“Appalled” (correct response). The participant’s task was to repeat
the word that they judged to reflect the mental state of the speaker
of the phrase. They had 3 s to respond on each trial before the next
one began. The auditory stimuli were presented throughout the
gambling or judgment of confidence tasks (in a fixed order).
Participants were informed that for every correct response on the
secondary mindreading task, they would win 30p; for every incor-
rect response, they would lose 30p; and if they failed to respond on
a given trial, they would lose 30p. All participants performed
above chance (.50) in each condition on the secondary mind-
reading task (M  .79, SD  .14 in the implicit condition and M 
.77, SD  .09 in the explicit condition) and, thus, none was
Table 3




t p d BF10ASD NT
Gambling Object-level: Sensitivity (d=) 0.99 (0.54) 1.00 (0.59) 0.11 .92 0.03 0.29
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c) .32 (.61) .07 (.57) 1.47 .15
Meta-level: M-ratio 1.04 (1.21) .60 (2.66) 0.76 .45 0.45 0.36
Judgement of confidence Object-level: Sensitivity (d=) 1.00 (0.60) 1.02 (0.60) 0.11 0.91 0.03 0.29
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c) .22 (.33) .13 (.57) .65 .52
Meta-level: M-ratio .51 (1.74) 1.45 (0.99) 2.37 .01 0.67 5.21
Note. ASD  autism spectrum disorder; NT  neurotypical; BF  Bayes factor.
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excluded for failure to engage in the secondary task. Explicit
feedback, on a trial-by-trial basis on the secondary task was not
provided, and participants were told at the end of the task what
their reward was for performance on the dual task.
Participants began with a practice task, which was split into
three parts. In the first part, they completed 10 trials of the primary
gambling or judgment-of-confidence task alone (identical to the
practice task completed by participants in the single-task condi-
tion). In the second part, they completed five trials of the second-
ary mindreading task alone. In the final part, they practiced both
the primary and secondary tasks together across 10 trials of the
primary task.
Statistical power and analysis. A power calculation using
GPower3 (Faul et al., 2007) revealed that, to detect a between-
condition (single/dual task) difference in judgment-of-confidence
accuracy of d  0.88, on 80% of occasions (Cohen, 1992) using
two-tailed tests, 22 participants per condition were required.
Bayesian analyses were also conducted to enable interpretation of
the between-condition difference in gambling accuracy (which we
predicted would be null).
Results
Table 4 shows object level performance (sensitivity and bias), as
well as metalevel performance (M-ratio scores) among participants
in each condition (single/dual) on each of the tasks (implicit
gambling/explicit judgment of confidence) tasks. Meta d= was
calculated separately for implicit task performance in the single-
task condition (M  1.38, SD  95) and dual-task condition (M 
1.33, SD  .95), as well as for explicit task performance in the
single-task condition (M  1.76, SD  76) and dual-task condition
(M  1.13, SD  1.05). These were then used to calculate the key
measure of metacognitive efficiency as an M-ratio. M-Ratio scores
(meta-d=/d=) were subject to a condition (single/dual)  task
(implicit gambling/explicit judgment of confidence) ANOVA,
which yielded a nonsignificant effect of task, F(1, 155)  2.16,
p  .14, p2  .01. The effect of condition was significant, F(1,
155)  8.27, p  .005, p2  .05, as was the Task  Condition
interaction, F(1, 155)  4.33, p  .03, p2  .03. Independent
samples t tests indicated that, on the explicit judgment of confi-
dence task, the M-ratio score was significantly lower in the dual-
task condition than in the single-task condition. On the implicit
gambling task, however, the M-ratio score did not differ signifi-
cantly across conditions (see Table 4).
Correlation analyses revealed that judgment-of-confidence
M-ratio score was nonsignificantly associated with performance
on the RMIE mindreading task, r  .15, p  .34, but was
associated significantly with performance on the Animations min-
dreading task, when analyzed using one-tailed tests of signifi-
cance, r  .26, p  .05. In contrast, implicit gambling M-ratio was
nonsignificantly associated with either RMIE or Animations min-
dreading measures, rs  .25, ps  .12.
Summary
In line with predictions, concurrent completion of a secondary
mindreading task impaired metacognitive monitoring accuracy
among neurotypical adults on a judgment of confidence task. In
contrast, concurrent completion of this secondary mindreading
task did not diminish “meta”-level performance on an implicit
gambling measure of the sort claimed to assess metacognitive
monitoring among nonhuman primates. These results mirror and
complement those found in Experiment 1, in which a group of
people with mindreading impairments (i.e. those with ASD)
showed diminished metalevel performance on the explicit judg-
ment of confidence task, but not the implicit gambling task.
It is clear from the results in Experiment 2 (as well as Experiment
1) that implicit gambling accuracy cannot rely on mindreading re-
sources in the same way that explicit judgment-of-confidence accu-
racy appears to, given that only the latter was detrimentally affected
by concurrent completion of a secondary task that tapped mindread-
ing. However, there is a possibility that the detrimental effect of
secondary-task completion on judgment-of-confidence accuracy in
Experiment 2 was not because the tasks shared a common metarep-
resentational processing resource. Rather, it could be that concurrent
completion of any secondary task, regardless of the processing re-
sources tapped by the secondary task, would detrimentally affect
judgment-of-confidence accuracy. In other words, it might be that
metacognition is disrupted by imposition of any additional cognitive
load (a general dual-task effect), rather than by imposition of addi-
tional metarepresentational load specifically (a specific dual-task ef-
fect). To address this, we devised two additional dual-task conditions
and had new groups of neurotypical participants complete the
judgment-of-confidence task under one of these conditions (n  31
per condition). We then compared judgment-of-confidence accuracy
in the single- and standard dual-task conditions (reported above) with
judgment-of-confidence accuracy in each of these additional dual-task
conditions.
In one condition (gender, sentence forward condition), participants
listened to the same auditory stimuli (from the Cambridge Mindread-
ing Voice battery) that participants in the standard dual-task condition
completed in Experiment 2, but judged the gender of the speaker
Table 4
Gambling and Judgement of Confidence Task Performance in the Single and Dual Task Condition (Experiment 2)
Task Variable
Condition
t p d BF10Single-task Dual-task
Gambling Object-level: Sensitivity (d=) 1.21 (0.68) 1.23 (0.50) 0.16 .87 0.04 0.23
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c) .02 (.51) .06 (.59) 0.32 .75 0.07 0.24
Meta-level: M-ratio 1.33 (1.21) 1.08 (0.87) 1.08 .28 0.24 0.39
Judgement of confidence Object-level: Sensitivity (d=) 1.31 (0.59) 1.27 (.74) 0.25 .80 0.06 0.24
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c) .31 (.51) .07 (1.15) 1.94 .06 0.43 1.17
Meta-level: M-ratio 1.52 (2.20) 0.02 (3.98) 2.50 .01 0.47 3.34
Note. BF  Bayes factor.
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(male/female) rather than the thought/emotion the speaker was expe-
riencing. In this condition, even though the task was to judge the
gender of the speaker, we thought it was possible that the thought/
emotion the speaker was experiencing could be processed automati-
cally. If the thought/emotion of the speaker was processed automat-
ically, even though it was not the goal of the task, then performing this
secondary task concurrently with the explicit judgment of confidence
task might reduce metacognitive efficiency (because, according to our
predictions, both tasks depend on mindreading). Therefore, we de-
signed a second control condition to rule out the possibility of auto-
matic activation of the mindreading system during task completion. In
this second control condition (gender, sentence backward), the stimuli
from the Cambridge Mindreading Voice battery task were rerecorded
by adult males and females who used neutral intonation. However, it
was not only the intonation of the voices in the Cambridge Mind-
reading Voice battery task that indicated the thoughts/emotions expe-
rienced by the speaker, but also the content of the sentences them-
selves. Therefore, to rule out automatic inference of mental states in
this gender, backward condition, the sentences were spoken in reverse
(e.g., “I’ve been waiting so long for this moment” became “moment
this for long so waiting been I’ve”). Again, participants were tasked
with judging the gender of the speaker, but we reasoned that mind-
reading would be (near-) impossible in this condition.
Experiment 3
Method
Participants. Thirty-one participants (4 male) completed the
judgment of confidence task alongside the gender, forward sen-
tences dual-task and 31 participants (10 male) completed the
judgment of confidence task alongside the gender, backward sen-
tences dual-task. The average age of participants who completed
the gender forward sentences dual-task condition was 23.48 years
(SD  5.23). The average age of participants who completed the
gender backward sentences dual-task condition was 23.10 years
(SD  6.64). All participants were recruited from the University of
Kent, in exchange for course credits as part of their degree or
payment, and from the local community. No participant had a
history of ASD, according to self-report. All participants provided
informed consent, and the study was ethically approved by the
University of Kent, School of Psychology Research Ethics Com-
mittee, 201715084953804613.
Materials and procedures. In Experiment 3, participants
completed the same judgment of confidence task used in Experi-
ment 2 but concurrently with one of two new secondary tasks. The
first new task was a “gender, forward sentences” secondary task
was identical to the secondary task used in Experiment 2 except in
one respect. In this new secondary task, after the presentation of
each sentence from the Cambridge Mindreading Voice Battery
(Golan et al., 2006), participants heard the words “male” and
“female” and had to report verbally which sex the speaker of the
sentence had been. Of the 40 stimuli used in the experiment, 24
were spoken by a male actor and 16 were spoken by a female actor.
The payment rules for this secondary task were the same as for the
secondary task in Experiment 2; for each correct gender judgment,
participants won 30p, for each incorrect judgment participants lost
30p, and if they failed to respond they lost 30p. All other proce-
dures, including the judgment-of-confidence task, practice proce-
dure, and payment rules, were identical to those outlined in Ex-
periment 2. One participant was excluded from the results based on
being a significant outlier, with an M-ratio score that was more
than 5.5 standard deviations different from the mean. No other
participant scored 3 SD different from the mean in any condi-
tion.
The second new task was a “gender, backward sentences”
secondary task. For this new task, the auditory stimuli from the
Cambridge Mindreading Voice Battery (Golan et al., 2006) was
rerecorded by three female and three male actors using a neutral
voice. As the actors removed any intonation, emphasis, and emo-
tion from their voice, any mental states automatically associated
with the speech would be reduced. In order to also rule out any
possibility of automatic mindreading, actors spoke each sentence
backward in order to minimize emotional content of the sentences.
So, for example, “He never helps at home” was recorded as “home
at helps never he.” Participants heard these new sentences and after
each heard the options “male” and “female.” Their task was to
identify the gender of the speaker for each sentence by verbally
reporting one of the two genders. All other aspects of the task were
identical to those employed in the gender, forward dual-task. All
participants performed above chance (.50) in each of the sec-
ondary tasks and, thus, none was excluded for failure to engage in
the secondary task.
Results
Meta d= was calculated for performance in the gender forward
dual-task condition (M  1.14, SD  .77) and the gender back-
ward dual-task condition (M  1.43, SD  .83). Means and
standard deviations for each dependent variable for the judgment-
of-confidence task in each of the supplementary dual-task condi-
tions are reported in Table 5. Independent t tests revealed no
significant effects between conditions in any of the variables.
Next, we compared judgment-of-confidence performance in each
of these control conditions with judgment-of-confidence perfor-
mance in each of the single- and dual-task conditions completed by
participants in Experiment 2. An initial series of ANOVAs re-
vealed a significant effect of condition (single-/dual-mindreading/
dual-gender forward sentences/dual-gender-backward) on M-ratio,
F(3, 136)  3.94, p  .01, p2  .08, but not object-level sensi-
tivity, F(3, 136)  0.32, p  .81, p2  .007, or object-level bias,
F(3, 136)  1.89, p  .13, p2  .04. Independent-samples t tests
revealed that M-ratio in the single task condition (from Experiment
2) was nonsignificantly different from M-ratio in either the dual-
gender-forward sentences condition, t(68)  1.15, p  .25, d 
0.28, BF10  0.44, or the dual-gender-backward sentences condi-
tion, t(69)  0.39, p  .70, d  0.09, BF10  0.26. In other words,
metacognitive monitoring accuracy was nonsignificantly affected
by completion of either of the control dual-task conditions. In
contrast, M-ratio, in the dual-mindreading task condition (from
Experiment 2) was significantly lower than in either the dual-
gender-forward sentences condition, t(68)  2.03, p  .05, d 
0.49, BF10  1.41, or the dual-gender-backward sentences condi-
tion, t(68)  2.56, p  .01, d  0.62, BF10  3.81.
Summary
In Experiment 3, we designed two control dual-task conditions,
a gender, forward sentences condition and a gender, backward
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sentences condition. Participants completed the explicit judgment-
of-confidence task under one of these two control conditions. The
aim was to show that completing an explicit metacognitive task
alongside a secondary task that did not require mindreading would
not have a significant detrimental effect on metacognitive accu-
racy. This is what we found. Metacognitive monitoring accuracy
on the primary judgment-of-confidence task was nonsignificantly
affected by completion of either of the control dual-task conditions
(reported in Experiment 3), relative to performance in the single-
task condition (reported in Experiment 2). Indeed, the only dual-
task condition to significantly negatively influence judgment-of-
confidence accuracy was the mindreading dual-task condition
reported in Experiment 2. Judgment-of-confidence accuracy was
significantly lower in the mindreading dual-task condition than in
any of the other three conditions (single-task, dual-task forward-
sentences, dual-task backward-sentences). This suggests that it is
mindreading specifically that is linked to metacognitive monitor-
ing and that taking up the resources required for the former has a
negative effect on the latter, in keeping with our predictions.
General Discussion
Across three experiments, we found consistent evidence in
support of our key hypotheses. To elaborate, with regard to our
first question about whether metacognition and mindreading share
the same metarepresentational resources (the one-system view),
we found that judgment-of-confidence accuracy was significantly
diminished in ASD, indicating that metacognition is impaired in
this disorder. Thus, contrary to the claims of some that metacog-
nition is unimpaired whereas mindreading is diminished in ASD,
we found no evidence of a dissociation between metacognition and
mindreading among participants with ASD. This finding is in
keeping with the prediction made by one-system views of the
relation between metacognition and mindreading and comple-
ments data obtained using other methods (Nicholson et al., 2019).
Of course, it is possible that ASD involves a “double hit” of
impairments that disrupt both metacognition and mindreading.
Such a finding alone would be clinically important but wouldn’t
necessarily count against two-systems or metacognition-is-prior
views. However, if the mindreading and metacognitive impair-
ments in ASD were the result of a double hit of independent
impairments, rather than as a result of a single metarepresenta-
tional faculty that processes mental states in others and self, then
there is no reason to suppose that taking up mindreading resources
in a dual-task paradigm would disrupt metacognition among neu-
rotypical individuals. Yet, in Experiment 2, we found judgment-
of-confidence accuracy was selectively impaired by concurrent
performance on a secondary mindreading task. This suggests that
the primary metacognition and secondary mindreading tasks were
competing for metarepresentational resources in a way that is
predicted only by one-system theories.
However, there is also the theoretical possibility—mentioned,
but set aside, in the introduction—of a version of metacognition-
is-prior view that claims a damaged metacognitive system is the
primary cause of mindreading deficits in ASD. While to the best of
our knowledge no one has proposed such a view, it is a possible
view, and nothing in the experiments conducted here rules it out.
It likewise remains possible that the reduced metacognitive
performance among participants with ASD in the explicit (but not
implicit) metacognition task was caused by something other than
reduced mindreading. The implicit and explicit tasks also differ in
the demands they make on linguistic ability, for example. While
we cannot exclude the possibility that there is some factor other
than mindreading that explains the differential performance in
ASD, it is unlikely to be a difference in linguistic abilities, since
these were closely matched with the control group.
Turning now to Experiments 2 and 3, it is important to highlight
that none of the task variables other than metacognitive accuracy
was affected by concurrent performance on the secondary mind-
reading task. Hence, it is not the case that merely performing a
secondary task disrupts primary task performance per se. Rather, it
was metacognitive accuracy that was selectively diminished by
concurrent mindreading (and continued to be diminished even
after the influence of all other task variables was controlled).
Finally, the detrimental effect on judgment-of-confidence meta-
cognitive accuracy of concurrent completion of a secondary task
appeared to be specific to when the secondary task involved
mindreading (in Experiment 2). When the judgment of confidence
task was completed alongside a dual-task that did not demand
mindreading (in Experiment 3), then metacognitive accuracy was
equivalent to that in the single-task condition reported above.
Thus, it was not the case that concurrent completion of any
secondary task disrupted metacognitive accuracy, but rather that
metacognitive accuracy was detrimentally affected when metarep-
resentational processing resources were taxed by the secondary
task. While this result is consistent with our one-system view,
taken on its own it is also consistent with a metacognition-is-prior
account.
We were unable to control for all possible differences between
the dual-tasks employed in Experiments 2 and 3, of course. It may
be that judging emotion from speech in order to make binary
selections among candidate emotion words, where the candidates
vary from trial to trial (Experiment 2), is inherently more difficult
Table 5
Mean (SD) Performance on Each Variable of the Judgement-of-Confidence Task in Each of the Dual-Task Conditions in Experiment 3
Variable
Condition





Object-level: Sensitivity (d=) 1.23 (0.68 1.16 (0.53) 0.40 .69 0.10 0.28
Object-level: Criterion/bias (c) .24 (.48) .44 (1.37) 0.74 .46 0.19 0.33
Meta-level: M-ratio 1.02 (1.06) 1.73 (2.36) 1.52 .14 0.39 0.68
Note. BF  Bayes factor.
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than making repeated binary judgments of gender (Experiment 3).
Perhaps the former task is more demanding of attention and/or
working memory. If that were the case, then it may be that this
additional load, rather than a specific drain on mindreading re-
sources, interfered with the explicit judgment-of-confidence task.
Future studies might explore this possibility further.
In keeping with our predictions, metalevel performance on the
explicit judgment of confidence task was associated significantly
(using one-tailed tests of significance) with performance on the
Animations measure of mindreading in both Experiments 1 and 2,
which replicates the finding of Nicholson et al. (2019) who ob-
served a similar sized association between judgment of confidence
accuracy and Animations task performance (r  .35 in their
study).
One issue to address, however, is the fact that RMIE mindread-
ing task performance was not associated significantly with
judgment-of-confidence accuracy in either Experiment 1 or 2,
contrary to our predictions and to the findings of Williams et al.
(2018) and Nicholson et al. (2019). We do not have a concrete
explanation for the nonsignificant association between judgment
of confidence accuracy and mindreading in the current study.
However, we note that an investigation into the correlations be-
tween mindreading and metacognition was not a key aim of the
current study, and we were aware that the study was not suffi-
ciently powered to detect the association predicted by one-system
theorists (note that replication studies likely require between 2.5
and 3.5 times the sample size of the original studies; e.g., Simon-
sohn, 2015, 2016). There is now a clear pattern emerging across
studies that indicate a consistently modest, but reliable, association
between metacognition and mindreading. Significant associations
between judgment of confidence accuracy and RMIE task perfor-
mance have been observed in independent samples by Williams et
al. (2018, r  .25), Nicholson et al. (2019, r  .26), and Carpenter
& Williams (under review, r  .26). To detect a correlation of .26
on 80% of occasions, a sample of 90 participants is required even
when using one-tailed tests. Therefore, we were aware that our
samples of N  50 in Experiment 1 and N  40 in Experiment 2
were not sufficiently powered to detect even predicted associa-
tions, which we acknowledge as a limitation. Nonetheless, it is
reassuring that the significant associations we observed between
judgment of confidence accuracy and Animations task perfor-
mance was of an almost-identical magnitude in both Experiments
1 (r  .24) and 2 (r  .26) as observed in the few previous studies
that have explored the relation between mindreading and metacog-
nition.
In sum, we found converging evidence from three experiments
that when mindreading resources are diminished (either clinically
in ASD or artificially in neurotypical people when performing a
dual task), so too are metacognitive resources. The overall pattern
of these findings would not be predicted by either two-systems or
metacognition-is-prior theorists, nor can it be explained straight-
forwardly by either of those theories. Rather, the results support
one-system views of the relation between mindreading and meta-
cognition.
Turning to our second question, regarding whether implicit
gambling tasks of the sort that have been claimed to measure
metacognition in nonhuman primates necessarily require metarep-
resentation, we also found consistent evidence for our predictions
from findings in Experiments 1 and 2. In Experiment 1, our sample
of ASD participants showed impairments in metarepresenting self
(judgment-of-confidence accuracy) and others (Animations), yet
still performed equivalently to the neurotypical comparison group
in terms of gambling accuracy. These findings suggest that gam-
bling tasks of the sort used among nonhuman primates do not
necessarily require metarepresentation (nor do they seem to in-
volve such metarepresentation in humans who undertake them),
but can be achieved using first-order risk-based affective apprais-
als of likely success.
Again, converging results were observed in Experiment 2.
Whereas judgment-of-confidence accuracy was consistently
and selectively impoverished by the imposition of a secondary
mindreading task, gambling accuracy (despite having an almost
identical task structure to the judgment-of-confidence task) was
not. The between-condition difference in gambling accuracy
was small, nonsignificant, and associated with a Bayes factor
that supported the null hypothesis. This shows that, even when
metarepresentational resources are taxed (by the secondary
mindreading task), gambling is as accurate as when metarepre-
sentational resources are not taxed at all (in the single-task
condition).
In addition, across both Experiments 1 and 2, performance on
the implicit and explicit tasks was uncorrelated. This result
speaks against the view that implicit gambling tasks of the sort
used to measure metacognitive processes in monkeys are actu-
ally doing so. For even though the implicit and explicit tasks
differ along a number of dimensions, if both tap into metacog-
nitive abilities, then performance in each should be signifi-
cantly correlated with the other. This finding complements the
finding by Nicholson et al. (2019) that implicit and explicit
performance on another of the tasks used to measure metacog-
nition in monkeys—namely, so-called “uncertainty monitoring”
tasks—is likewise uncorrelated. Specifically, in Nicholson et al.
(2019), a group of adults with ASD and a matched control
group of neurotypical adults completed a classic explicit meta-
cognitive task, similar to the explicit task used in the current
study, as well an implicit (“strategic opt-out”) measure that was
different to the gambling paradigm used in the current study.
The implicit task involved making perceptual discriminations,
with success resulting in financial reward and failure resulting
in financial penalty. The crucial feature of this paradigm is that
participants could choose to opt-out of any given trial and avoid
penalty or reward on that trial. This kind of paradigm is used
frequently among nonhuman primates, with adaptive use of the
opt-out option on difficult trials taken to indicate that the
participant metarepresents their own state of uncertainty when
faced with a challenging trial and behaves accordingly. Yet,
Nicholson et al. (2019) found that participants with ASD made
adaptive use of the opt-out option to the same extent as neuro-
typical participants, despite showing significant impairments in
explicit metacognitive accuracy and mindreading accuracy
(with performance on the latter two tasks correlated signifi-
cantly, despite neither being correlated with strategic opting
out). Just as in the current study, therefore, Nicholson et al.
observed a dissociation between performance on classic meta-
cognitive tasks and tasks of the sort that are claimed to reveal
metacognition in nonhuman primates. This calls into question
whether such implicit tasks really require metarepresentation of
one’s own internal states for successful performance. It remains
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possible, however, that metacognitive abilities fractionate along
a number of different dimensions, with one subset of abilities
being accessed by our implicit tasks, and another subset utilized
in the explicit tasks. This, too, could explain the lack of corre-
lation.
Even if it were true that humans fail to metarepresent their own
states when they gamble accurately in our implicit tasks, it may be
that nonhuman primates nevertheless do so. However, our results
suggest that one should use caution when interpreting the gam-
bling performance of nonhumans. If humans, a species we know to
be capable of accurate metacognition, do not need to metarepresent
their own states to gamble accurately, then we should arguably be
skeptical of claims that nonhumans do need to metarepresent their
states on such tasks. Moreover, if implicit tasks of the sort suc-
cessfully employed with monkeys are not genuinely metacognitive
in nature, then one important strand of support for metacognition-
is-prior accounts is undercut.
In sum, the current study has significant implications for both
theory development and clinical practice. Taken together, our
findings are in keeping with only one of the theories considered,
which is striking given that several predictions overlap across
theories, highlighting how challenging it is to distinguish them
empirically. The findings suggest, on the one hand, that implicit
gambling paradigms of the sort used to test “metacognition” in
nonhuman animals do not, in fact, measure awareness of one’s
own mental states (not in humans, at any rate). On the other hand,
the results suggest that accuracy of explicit metacognitive judg-
ments about one’s own mental states depends to a significant
extent on mindreading ability. As a result, people with ASD, who
have established mindreading difficulties, also show significantly
weaker performance on explicit metacognitive tasks (but not im-
plicit gambling tasks).
This work had its roots in two suggestions made by Carruthers
(2009, 2011) on theoretical grounds. The first was that the same
faculty underlies both mindreading of others and metacognition of
self. This view was shared by Williams (e.g., 2010; see also,
Williams, Lind, & Happé’s [2009] commentary on Carruthers,
2009), and endorsed by him as an explanation for key difficulties
in both other- and self-awareness experienced by many people
with ASD. The second suggestion was that so-called nonverbal
“metacognitive” tasks employed with nonhuman animals are not
genuinely metacognitive in nature. This led to discussions about
how best to test these theoretical predictions, resulting in Nichol-
son et al. (2019) and the present study. Future work may extend the
framework to employ other methods or to test other types of
alleged implicit metacognition.
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